In Opposition to the School Prayer

Amendment
Geoffrey R. Stonet

Twenty years ago, in Engel v. Vitale,' the Supreme Court invalidated the practice of government sponsored prayer in the public schools. In 1951, the New York Board of Regents, "aware of the
dire need.., to pass on America's Moral and Spiritual Heritage to
our youth,"2 devised a prayer to be recited at the opening of
classes each day to "strengthen . . the belief in a Supreme Being."'3 The prayer: "'Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents,
our teachers and our Country.' "4 The Board of Education for the
New Hyde Park school district directed that the Regents' prayer
be said at the beginning of each school day and that the students
be led by the teacher or by a student singled out by the teacher for
this purpose.5 Students who did not wish to participate were excused from participation or permitted to leave the classroom.6
The Court, in a six-to-one decision, held that "by using its
public school system to encourage recitation of the Regents'
prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. ' '1 Justice Black, speaking for the Court, explained that "this very practice of establishing
governmentally composed prayers for religious services was one of
the reasons which caused many of our early colonists to leave Eng-

t Professor of Law, University of Chicago. This article is adapted from my testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 16, 1982, concerning the proposed
School Prayer Amendment. I should like to thank Philip Kurland, Cass Sunstein, and William Marshall for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
370 U.S. 421 (1962).

Brief of the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York as Amicus
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ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrD STATES: CONSTrTUTIONAL LAw

959, 974

(P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Kurland & Casper].
3 Id.

at 15, reprinted in Kurland & Casper, supra note 2, at 975.
" Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 422 (quoting the New York Regents' prayer).
6Id.

" Id. at 438 (Douglas, J., concurring).
7 Id. at 424. Justices Frankfurter and White did not participate in the decision. Id. at
436. Justice Stewart dissented. Id. at 444.
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land and seek religious freedom in America.", As a result, Black
noted, the framers of the first amendment "knew the anguish,
hardship and bitter strife that could come when zealous religious
groups struggled with one another to obtain the Government's
stamp of approval."9 They added the first amendment to the Constitution in part to assure "that the people's religions [would] not
be subjected to the pressures of government for change each time a
new political administration is elected to office." 10 Thus, Black
concluded, "the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting
an establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government to compose official
prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of
a religious program carried on by government."11
Moreover, Black maintained that "[n]either the fact that the
prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of students is voluntary can serve to free it from
the limitations of the Establishment Clause.

' 12

On the coercion is-

sue, Black suggested that "laws officially prescribing a particular
form of religious worship [may in fact] involve coercion," for
"[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government is
placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive
pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."13 Ultimately, however, Black
found it unnecessary to rule on coercion, for "[tihe Establishment
Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any
showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the
enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those
laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not." 4
The establishment clause, Black explained, was premised upon two
central assumptions: "that a union of government and religion
tends to destroy government and to degrade religion," 15 and "that
governmentally established religions and religious persecutions go
hand in hand."1 " Black concluded that, wholly apart from any coercion, "[t]he New York Laws officially prescribing the Regents'
8 Id. at 425.

* Id. at 429.

10 Id. at 430.

11Id. at 425.
" Id. at 430.
13Id. at 431.
14

Id. at 430.

1 Id. at 431.

,6Id. at 432.
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prayer" were "inconsistent" with these assumptions. 7 In answer to
the argument that the Regents' prayer "does not amount to a total
establishment of one particular religious sect to the exclusion of all
others," and that "the Regents' official prayer is so brief and general [that] there can be no danger to religious freedom in its governmental establishment," Black called forth the words of the author of the first amendment, James Madison: "'[I]t is proper to
take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties .... Who does
not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in
exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease
any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other[s]?',,
One year after Engel, in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 19 the Court considered the constitutionality of a
Pennsylvania law requiring all public schools to begin each day
with a reading of "'[a]t least ten verses from the Holy Bible.' "2o
Pursuant to this statute, the Abington Senior High School broadcast "opening exercises" through an intercommunications system
while pupils attended their homerooms or advisory sections. These
"exercises" included readings by selected students of the ten verses
from the Bible. The school permitted the student reading the
verses to select the passages and to read from any version he chose,
although the school furnished copies of only the King James version. Following the readings, a student recited the Lord's Prayer,
also over the intercommunications system. Students were asked to
stand and join in repeating the prayer in unison. Students who
wished not to participate could leave the classroom or simply remain silent.2 '
22
Building upon Engel, the Court, in an eight-to-one decision,
held this practice unconstitutional. Justice Clark, speaking for the
Court, recognized that "'[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.'" 23 Indeed, Clark noted, our
religious background "is evidenced today" in oaths of office and in
the prayers with which legislative and judicial sessions tradition-

17

Id. at 433.

11 Id. at 436 (quoting J.

MADiSON, MEMORiAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS

ASSESsssS, reprinted in 2 WRMTINGS OF MADISON 183, 185-86 (G. Hunt ed. 1900-1910)).

Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments is reprinted in full
in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 app. (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
29 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

1*Id. at 205 (quoting 24 PA.
2

"'
23

STAT.

§ 15-1516 (Purdon 1960)).

Id. at 206-07.
As in Engel, Justice Stewart dissented. Id. at 308.
Id. at 213 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
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ally begin. 4 Clark emphasized, however, that "religious freedom is
strongly embedded in our public and private
...
likewise ...
life."'25 Thus, Clark explained, if either the purpose or primary effect of a law "is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the
enactment [violates the first amendment]. 2 6 Clark added that this
"wholesome 'neutrality'" does not reflect any hostility to religion
but, rather, is designed to prevent "a fusion of governmental and
religious functions or a concert or dependency of one upon the
2' 7
other.
Applying this "purpose or primary effect" standard to
Schempp itself, Clark noted that the "exercises are prescribed as
part of the curricular activities of students who are required by law
to attend school" and that "such an opening exercise is a religious

ceremony and was intended by the State to be

So. '' 2s

Clark thus

concluded that the exercise violated "the command of the First
Amendment that the Government '29maintain strict neutrality,
neither aiding nor opposing religion.
The decisions in Engel and Schempp triggered heated debate.
Not surprisingly, the reaction divided sharply along denominational lines: Catholics tended to condemn the decisions; Jews were
generally supportive; Protestants were divided.3 0 Since 1962, critics
of the decisions have attempted to overturn them by constitutional
amendment. More than fifty proposed constitutional amendments
were introduced in Congress within three days of the Engel decision, and following Schempp, by the close of the Eighty-eighth
Congress, more than one hundred fifty amendments had been introduced.31 Proposed constitutional amendments seeking to overturn these decisions have been introduced in Congress in every
year since 1962. The Senate has voted twice on such proposals, the
House once. In each instance the measure was defeated. 2
On May 17, 1982, President Ronald Reagan proposed a constitutional amendment to "remove the bar to school prayer estab:4 Id. at 213.
25 Id. at 214.
26 Id. at 222.
7 Id.

:8 Id. at 223.
9, Id. at 225.
'0 See Kurland, The Regents' PrayerCase: "Fullof Sound and Fury, Signifying ......

1962 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 2.
31 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LBRARY OF CONGRESS, LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSED CONsTrruTONAL AMENDMENT ON SCHOOL PRAYER 22 n.45

(1982).
32

Id. at 22-25.

1983]

School Prayer Amendment

lished by the Supreme Court and allow prayer back in our
schools."3 3 The proposed amendment provides:
Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prohibit individual or group prayer in public schools or other public institutions. No person shall be required by the United States
34
or by any State to participate in prayer.
This amendment should not be enacted.
I.

Engel AND Schemmp EMBODY A REASONABLE INTERPRETATION
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Engel and Schempp are founded upon a perfectly sensible understanding of the establishment clause. They are in accord with
the Court's precedents3 5 and are consistent with the language, purposes, and history of the first amendment.
The practice of government sponsored prayer in the public
schools implicates the most fundamental values underlying the
first amendment. Unlike other establishment clause questions, the
school prayer issue does not involve the mere neutral provision of
wholly secular government services, such as fire and police protection, to both religious and secular institutions.3 6 Nor does it involve the mere neutral and essentially passive acquiescence of government in the conduct of both religious and secular activities on
government property, such as the distribution of leaflets on public
streets.
Rather, government sponsored prayer in the public
schools involves direct and active government involvement in the
encouragement and structuring of perhaps the most basic form of
religious activity-prayer itself. For government to compose, select, or promote prayers to be recited by children in a setting dedi', President's Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation, 18 WEEKLY
Comp. PREs. Doc. 664, 665 (May 17, 1982) (regarding Constitutional Amendment on Prayer
in School) [hereinafter cited as President's Message].
' Id.
at 666.
See Kurland, supra note 30, at 25-29.
s Cf. Wolnan v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (constitutional for state to provide parochial school pupils with the same textbooks, standardized testing, and diagnostic services it
provides public school pupils); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (constitutional to

provide federal construction grants to church-affiliated universities for buildings and facilities to be used exclusively for secular educational purposes). But cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971) (unconstitutional to reimburse parochial school for expenditures on
teacher salaries).
S7 Cf. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). Cf. also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569 (1941) (parading on public streets); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(soliciting on public streets).
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cated specifically to the inculcation and "preservation of. . . values" 38 would clearly seem to undermine the constitutionally
compelled separation of church and state.
Three arguments are most commonly offered in opposition to
this conclusion. First, it is sometimes said that Engel and
Schempp are predicated upon a misguided notion of "neutrality."
Under this view, the establishment clause "command[s] .impartiality... [only] as among the various sects of theistic religions, that
is, religions that profess a belief in God. But as between theistic
religions and those nontheistic creeds that do not acknowledge
God, the precept of neutrality . . . [does] not obtain." ' Accordingly, so-called "nondenominational" prayers, such as the Regents'
prayer invalidated in Engel, pose no establishment clause issue.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that the proposed constitutional amendment cannot be defended on this basis, for as its
does not
proponents concede, "[t]he proposed amendment ...
...
limit prayer in public schools .. . to 'nondenominational
prayer.'-40 In any event, this understanding of the clause seems
inconsistent with the central premise of religious toleration upon
which the first amendment is founded, for under this view the establishment clause would not protect the members of such faiths
as "Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and
others. '41 A more inclusive and more reasonable interpretation,
long embraced by the Court, holds not only that the establishment
clause forbids "governmental preference of one religion over another," but also that it takes "'every form of propagation of religion out of the realm of things which could directly or indirectly be
made public business.' ,,41 Under this interpretation, government
cannot "constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which
aid all religions as against non-believers, and [it cannot] aid those
of God as against those
religions based on a belief in the existence
4
religions founded on different beliefs.'

Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979).
Rice, The Prayer Amendment: A Justification,24 S.C.L. REv. 705, 710 (1972).
Constitutional Amendment Relating to School
40 The Administration's Proposed
Prayer 28 (May 17, 1982) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as Administration Statement].
41 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 & n.11 (1961). See also Cahn, On Government
and Prayer,37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 981, 993-94 (1962) (listing "types of religious conscience" and
denominations that would find "nondenominational prayer" such as the Regents' prayer
unacceptable).
42 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963) (quoting Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 26 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
43 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (footnotes omitted).
38

"
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Moreover, even if the less inclusive interpretation were supportable, the very concept of a "nondenominational prayer" is selfcontradictory. There are well over fifty different theistic sects in
the United States," each of which has its own tenets regarding the
appropriate nature and manner of prayer. Any effort to compose a
truly nondenominational prayer must thus produce, at best, a sterile litany virtually devoid of true religious meaning. Indeed, even
the Regents' prayer in Engel embodies numerous sectarian presumptions-that it is appropriate to pray orally, in unison with
others, and in public; that it is appropriate to invoke divine blessing for one's parents; that the appropriate subject of prayer is a
unitary, immanent, and metaphysical "God" who is "almighty";
that the appropriate relationship of human beings to "God" is one
of supplication and dependence; and that it is appropriate to
"beg. ' 45 Finally, even if one could compose a meaningful nondenominational prayer, there is the very real and widely recognized
danger that the "official promotion of common-denominator religious practices" could contribute to the development of an "official
folk religion" and thus undermine the "vitality. .. of the historic
faiths. ' " '" This is, of course, one of the evils that the first amendment was designed to prevent, for as the Court observed in Engel,
one of the assumptions underlying the establishment clause is
"that a ''union
of government and religion tends . . . to degrade
47

religion.

1

A second objection that is occasionally lodged against Engel
and Schempp turns on the notion that the school prayer issue involves a conflict between the establishment clause and the free exercise clause and that the Court did not give sufficient weight to
the free exercise interests of those students and parents who desire
government sponsored prayer in the public schools. 48 This argument was first elaborated by Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in Schempp. He argued that "a compulsory state educational
system so structures a child's life" that "parents who want their
children exposed to religious influences" might not be able ade4 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES

1981, at 52-53 (102d ed. 1981).

45Prepared Testimony of William VanAlstyne on S.J. Res. 199 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (Sept. 16, 1982) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). For a similar argument, see Cahn, supra note 41, at 993-94.
46Kauper, Prayer,Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1031, 1065
(1963); see also Kurland, supra note 30, at 30-31.
47 370 U.S. at 431.
48 See Administration Statement, supra note 40, at 21.
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quately to "fulfill that wish off school property and outside school
time. ' 49 Although Stewart conceded that such parents would have
a right under the free exercise clause to send their children to private or parochial school,50 he maintained that this consideration
was "too facile to be determinative" because, as the Court had recognized in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,"1 "'[f]reedom of speech, freedom of the press, [and] freedom of religion are available to all, not
merely to those who can pay their own way.' ,,51
This argument proves too much, for it would logically authorize not only school prayer, but "state sponsorship of the full panoply of denominational instruction available in private schools." 3
Why, after all, should the line be drawn at one highly ritualistic
prayer? Moreover, Justice Stewart's reliance on Murdock is fundamentally misplaced, for there is a critical difference for first
amendment purposes between the proposition, established in Murdock, that government may not unreasonably tax religious activity,
and the proposition, put forth by Justice Stewart, that government
may affirmatively promote such activity.5 4 Finally, it should be emphasized that the school prayer issue does not pose a "true" conflict between the establishment clause and the free exercise clause,
for as even Justice Stewart appeared to concede, the refusal of government to sponsor prayer in the public schools would not itself
violate the free exercise clause. 5
This is not to say that Justice Stewart's theory is wholly without foundation. To the contrary, as the Court noted in Schempp,
there may indeed be circumstances in which a practice that would
otherwise violate the establishment clause would be upheld because of the nature and strength of competing "free exercise" interests. The Court suggested, for example, that the government's
employment of chaplains to serve members of the armed forces
might not be unconstitutional, for in such circumstances "the Government regulates the temporal and geographic environment of individuals to a point that, unless it permits voluntary religious ser"' Schempp, 374 U.S., at 313 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 312-13 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925)).
319 U.S. 105 (1943).
52 374 U.S. at 313 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
at 111).
"' See Pollak, The Supreme Court 1962 Term-Foreword:Public Prayers in Public
Schools, 77 HARv. L. RE V. 62, 75 (1963).
" Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment's
limitation on the use of Medicaid funds for abortions).
55 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 316 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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vices to be conducted with the use of government facilities,
military personnel would be unable to engage in the practice of
their faiths.15 6 That surely is not the case with respect to students

in the public schools. Given the many alternatives available, the
prohibition of government sponsored prayer in the public schools
hardly seems a significant obstacle to the ability of students to
57
practice their faiths.

The third argument that is occasionally advanced in opposition to Engel and Schempp is that "the history of the Establishment Clause

. .

. [does] not support the Supreme Court's conclu-

sion that public prayer in schools is unconstitutional."5 8 In his
opinion for the Court in Engel, Justice Black suggested that the
result was virtually dictated by the intent of the framers. In fact, it
seems fair to say that Black's use of history was somewhat "overdrawn," 59 for a careful review of the record indicates more ambiguity than Black acknowledges. This is not to say, however, that the
claim that Engel and Schempp are contrary to the intent of the
framers is any less "overdrawn." As is often the case, the appeal to
the intent of the framers yields mixed and conflicting conclusions.
The point, of course, is not that history is no guide. It is, rather,
that resort to the intent of the framers is a slippery business that
must be approached with caution."0
There are essentially three facets to the historical attack on
the Court's decisions. At the most specific level, it is argued that
"the framers of the first amendment did not intend to forbid pub56Id. at 226 n.10.
17 See infra notes 122-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of alternatives that
may be available even during school hours or on school grounds. There is, finally, another
aspect of Stewart's argument that merits note. Stewart argued in Schempp that a refusal to
permit religious exercises in the schools may be seen, "not as the regulation of state neutrality, but rather as the establishment of a religion of secularism." 374 U.S. at 313 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). But this, too, proves too much. As the Court observed in Schempp, although
"the State may not establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of affirmatively opposing
or showing hostility to religion," id. at 225, a ban on government sponsored prayer in the
public schools hardly violates that precept, id.; Kauper, supra note 46, at 1054-55. And
although the "secularism" of the public schools may be a cause for concern, there are nu-

merous remedies available that are much less intrusive on establishment clause values than
the institution of government sponsored prayer. See infra notes 122-46 and accompanying

text.
s Administration Statement, supra note 40, at 20.
59Pollak, supra note 53, at 65; see Kauper, supra note 46, at 1050-51; Rice, supra note
39, at 710-15.

60 See Kurland, supra note 30, at 22. See generally Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,
56 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 469 (1981) (discussing the role of the framers' intent in constitutional
interpretation).
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lic prayer." 1 To support this contention, the critics of Engel and
Schempp point out, for example, that the First Congress, which
drafted the first amendment, "retained a chaplain to offer public
prayers" and, "the day after proposing the First Amendment,
called on President Washington to proclaim 'a day of public

thanksgiving and prayer.'

",62

Although the framers of the first amendment did not intend to
forbid such public prayer, that is not the issue. For as the Court
made clear in both Engel and Schempp, those decisions turned on
the very special characteristics of school prayer. In Engel, for example, Justice Black explained that "nothing in the decision
reached here . . . is inconsistent with . . . [the] many manifestations in our public life of belief in God. . . . [Most] patriotic or
ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned
religious exercise that the State of New York has sponsored in this
instance."6 3 Similarly, in Schempp, Justice Clark expressly distinguished the clearly "religious" exercises that were "prescribed as
part of the curricular activities of students who are required by law
to attend school" 4 from such matters as the inclusion in oaths of
office of the final supplication "[so] help me God" and the traditional commencement of legislative and judicial sessions with an
opening prayer. 5
Thus, that "the framers did not intend to forbid public
prayer" 6 generally tells us very little about their intent with respect to the very special problem of government sponsored prayer
in the public schools, where the environment is dedicated to the
inculcation of values and "where immature and impressionable
children are [especially] susceptible to a pressure to conform and
to participate in the expression of religious beliefs." ' And, of
course, the framers themselves gave no distinct consideration to
the particular question of devotional exercises in public schools, for
education as the framers knew it was confined almost exclusively
to private schools."' Finally, even if the framers had expressed an
intent on this question, it is not at all clear that it is sensible for
*' President's Message, supra note 33, at 665.
62 Administration Statement, supra note 40, at 1 (quoting Rice, supra note 39, at 715).
63 370 U.S. at 435 n.21 (emphasis added).
" 374 U.S. at 223.
61 Id. at 213.
6,President's Message, supra note 33, at 665.
67 Kauper, supra note 46, at 1046. See Schwengel, The PrayerAmendment: A Rebuttal, 24 S.C.L. REv. 723, 730 (1972).
68 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 238 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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their intent to control our present understanding of the clause.
The religious composition of our society and the general structure
of American education have changed fundamentally since the enactment of the first amendment. We may well be truer to the intent of the framers if we look not to their specific intent based on
their immediate circumstances but to whether, in the light of
changed circumstances, a challenged practice tends to promote the
type of interdependence of religion and state that the first amendment was designed to prevent.
The second facet of the historical attack focuses on the
Court's interpretation of the establishment clause at a more general level. In attempting to come to grips with the ambiguities of
the clause, the Court often has sought guidance in the writings of
Thomas Jefferson and of James Madison, the original author of
the first amendment.8 9 Indeed, to "anyone conversant . . . with
Madison's Memorial of 1785" and with the Court's reliance on
Madison's views, the decision in Engel "ought scarcely to have
been surprising. 7 0 Critics of the Court's decisions maintain, however, that the Court has paid too much attention to the views of
Jefferson and Madison and not enough attention to the views of
others who contributed to the framing of the first amendment.
These critics argue that a consideration of the other views would
lead to an understanding of the clause considerably narrower than
that embraced by the Court. The Reagan Administration argues,
for example, that a consideration of these other views would
demonstrate that "the concern the Congress wished to address by
the amendment was the fear that the federal government might
establish a national church, use its influence to prefer certain sects
over others, or require or compel persons to worship in a manner
contrary to their conscience," and that "in addressing that concern, Congress did not want to act in a manner that would be
harmful to religion generally or would defer to the small minority
who held no religion. ' 1 This interpretation is not wholly implausible, but neither is the Court's. To the contrary, on any fair reading
of the record there is "sufficient historical evidence to justify" the
Court's interpretation.7 2 At best, then, the contrary interpretation
" See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 436; Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 1113, 16 (1947).
7' Calm, supra note 41, at 986.
71 Administration Statement, supra note 40, at 11-12. This is, of course, merely another
version of the "neutrality" argument. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
72 Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Congress and the Schools: An HistoricalPerspective, 52 VA. L. REv. 1395, 1463 (1966).
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warrants the traditional Scotch verdict: not proven.
The final facet of the historical attack turns not on the intent
of the framers, but on the observation that "there has been a long
tradition of including some form of prayer in the public schools
ever since their inception. '73 Although the existence of such a "tradition" may be relevant to constitutional interpretation, it is
hardly dispositive. Otherwise, such landmark decisions as Brown v.
Board of Education7 4 and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 5 would

not stand. In any event, at the time of the Engel and Schempp
decisions, the "tradition" of school prayer was not nearly as firmly
entrenched as the proponents of the proposed amendment would
like to believe. By 1962, a number of states had outlawed school
prayer entirely,7 and only twenty-two states had actually sanctioned it by statute or judicial decision. 7 A 1962 survey revealed
that less than half the school systems in the United States conducted Bible readings and orily about one third of the systems required prayers at the beginning of the school day. 8
The central holding of both Engel and Schempp is that government sponsored prayer in the public schools violates the establishment clause because its purpose and primary effect is to aid
religion.7 9 This conclusion is founded upon a reasonable understanding of the first amendment.80 Moreover, these decisions have
Administration Statement, supra note 40, at 5.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
75 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
7' See, e.g., People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 Ill.
334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910);
Herold v. Parish Bd. of School Directors, 136 La. 1034, 68 So. 116 (1915); State ex rel.
Freeman v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 853, 91 N.W. 846 (1902), aff'd on rehearing, 65 Neb. 876, 93
N.W. 169 (1903); State ex rel. Finger v. Weedman, 55 S.D. 343, 226 N.W. 348 (1929); State
ex rel. Dearle v. Frazier, 102 Wash. 369, 173 P. 35 (1918); State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd.,
73
74

76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967 (1890). For discussion of these cases, see D. BOLES, THE BIBLE,
RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 108-32 (1965); Harrison, The Bible, the Constitution

and Public Education, 29 TENN. L. REv. 363, 386-89 (1962); Note, Bible Reading in Public
Schools, 9 VAND. L. REv. 849 (1956).
7' Comment, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Religion in the Public
Schools, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 73, 87 (1963).
'78 See J. LAUBACH, SCHOOL PRAYERS 32-33 (1969).

See supra notes 14-18, 26-29 and accompanying text.
80Indeed, long before these decisions, a number of state courts had embraced similar
constructions of analogous state constitutional provisions. See cases and authorities cited
supra note 76. Moreover, of the nine Justices who participated in Engel and Schempp, only
Justice Stewart dissented. The decisions were thus endorsed not only by the so-called Warren Court "liberals," but also by such moderate-to-conservative Justices as Harlan, Clark,
and White. And, for what it is worth, the academic commentary has generally been quite
favorable. See, e.g., Cahn,supra note 41; Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard,47 MINN. L. REv. 329 (1963); Kauper, supra note 46; Kurland, supra note 30; Pollak, supra note 53. But see Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark-A
79
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clearly withstood the test of time. Despite dramatic changes in the
makeup of the Court, Engel and Schempp have never been called
into question. To the contrary, they remain important and vital
components of the Court's contemporary interpretation of the first
amendment.8 1 Thus, those who support the proposed constitutional amendment must forthrightly recognize that they seek to
overturn not just two decisions of the Supreme Court, but an established precept of our first amendment jurisprudence.
II. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT IS UNSOUND AS A MATTER OF
POLICY

Even if Engel and Schempp were "wrongly" decided, the proposed constitutional amendment still should not be enacted. However well-meaning the amendment's proponents may be, the policies underlying the amendment are fundamentally unsound. This
is so not only for the reasons elaborated in Engel and Schempp,
but for at least two additional reasons as well.
First, there is the problem of coercion. Almost everyone would
agree that government should not compel an individual to recite a
prayer or affirm a belief that is contrary to his religious faith. Such
a practice could not be squared with the establishment clause, the
free exercise clause, or with our traditions as a free society. The
framers of the proposed amendment recognize this, for the proposed amendment provides not only that "[n]othing in this Constitution shall be construed to prohibit individual or group prayer in
public schools or other public institutions," but also that "[n]o
person shall be required . . . to participate in prayer." '
Although recognizing the right of the individual not to be coerced "to participate in prayer," the proponents of the proposed
amendment explicity reject "the 'implied coercion' theory of [Engel]" and substitute in its stead what they term a "[r]easonable
accommodation" of the confficting interests.8 3 This accommodation
focuses on the interests of school children. The amendment's supporters conclude that "persons who do not wish to participate in
prayer should be excused or may remain silent, but that should not

Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme Court to ConstitutionalQuestions, 8 UTAH L.
RaV. 167 (1963); Rice, supra note 39.
81 For a recent example, see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), in which the Court,
relying upon Schempp and Engel, held unconstitutional a Kentucky statute requiring the
posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on the wall of each public school classroom.
81 President's Message, supra note 33, at 666.
83 Administration Statement, supra note 40, at 32.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[50:823

interfere with or deny the rights of others who do wish to participate. '8 4 There are at least two difficulties with this seemingly
straightforward analysis. First, as the Court recognized in Engel
and Schempp, there are important societal, institutional, and constitutional interests at stake here. These interests go beyond those
of the children immediately affected; wholly apart from any coercion, the government has no business promoting religion in the
public schools.8 5 Second, and more to the point, the "reasonable
accommodation" of the amendment's proponents is too facile-it is
premised upon a naive and simplistic conception of "voluntary"
participation.
As the Court noted in Engel, "[w]hen the power, prestige and
financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is
plain." 88 The problem is especially acute, of course, when the
member of the religious minority is a child and the "indirect coercive pressure" is brought to bear in a school environment. Social
psychologists and sociologists have long observed that children
place special importance on how they are regarded by their classmates. The urge to conform to their classmates' attitudes can often
induce children to go along with the majority and do or say things
that they are convinced are wrong, or that they would not otherwise do or say.8 7 School prayer poses an especially "cruel dilemma,"88s for as a number of state courts have long recognized,
"[t]he exclusion of a pupil from [religious] exercises in which the
rest of the school joins, separates him from his fellows, puts him in
a class by himself, deprives him of his equality with the other
pupils, subjects him to a religious stigma and places him at a disadvantage in the school."8 " Thus, as Justice Frankfurter has explained: "That a child is offered an alternative [to participation]
may reduce the constraint; it does not eliminate the operation of
influence by the school in matters sacred to conscience and outside

"

Id.

at 34.

6' See supra notes 12-17,

86 Engel, 370 U.S. at 431.

26-29, 79-80 and accompanying text.

See Choper, supra note 80, at 344, and authorities cited therein.
" Schempp, 374 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring).
89 People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 IMI.334, 351, 92 N.E. 251, 256 (1910). See
also Herold v. Parish Bd. of School Directors, 136 La. 1034, 1050, 68 So. 116, 121 (1915)
("[t]he exclusion of a pupil [from religious exercises] puts him in a class by himself; it subjects him to a religious stigma"); State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 200, 44
N.W. 967, 975 (1890) (a pupil excused from religious exercises "loses caste with his fellows,
and is liable to be regarded with aversion and subjected to reproach and insult").
37
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the school's domain. The law of imitation operates, and non-conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children. The result
is an obvious pressure upon children to [conform].""s
Ultimately, of course, the question turns on what we mean by
"coercion." The question is not one of semantics. The answer will
not be found in a dictionary. It will be found in the definition not
of a word, but of a relationship-the relationship of citizen to state
in our society. How much pressure is "too much"? The answer depends not only on the amount of pressure, but on other factors as
well: Who is the individual? What is he being "pressured" to do?
What competing interests are furthered by the government action
that generates the "pressure" to conform?
In the school prayer context, the individual is a child. Moreover, the pressure is not to do homework or to be on time for class,
but to recite a prayer that may contradict the child's religious
faith. He is pressured, in other words, to do an act that runs
counter to our most cherished traditions of individual dignity and
religious freedom. Further, the pressure to conform in this context,
however indirect or unintended, is substantial indeed. The proponents of the amendment argue, however, that the pressure is justified by the government's interest in enabling those who wish to
pray in the public schools to do so."1 I cannot agree. Although recognition of a "dissenter's veto" is always troubling, our historic
commitment to religious freedom is founded on protecting the
rights of dissenters. Moreover, the government interest said to support the proposed amendment seems attenuated at best. Given the
many alternatives available to those who wish to pray, 92 the inability to participate in government sponsored prayer in the public
schools hardly seems a significant obstacle to the practice of their
faiths. The proposed amendment is thus not a "reasonable
accommodation."
Before leaving the coercion issue, there are two subsidiary
points I should like to address, if briefly. First, it is sometimes said
that the plight of the nonconforming student should not be given
'0Illinois ex rel. McCollum

v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,

concurring). The result of this pressure to conform is illustrated in Schempp, where the
children's father permitted them to participate in religious activities that were contrary to
their religious beliefs because he did not want his children to be labeled as "'odd balls'" or
atheists and to "'have to stand in the hall outside their "homeroom" '" as if they were
being punished "'for bad conduct.'" 374 U.S. at 208 & n.3 (quoting the district court's
summary of the father's testimony, 201 F. Supp. 815, 818 (1962)).
" See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
"fSee infra notes 122-46 and accompanying text.
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much weight because "these pressures to conform are part of the
normal social pattern[,] and part of the price of being a religious
nonconformist is the social stigma which all nonconformists have
to bear."9 3 Indeed, the experience of being "set apart" in this manner arguably may be "educational" and perhaps even "desirable."" 4
This view is misguided. Religious and other minorities have
enough trouble without government adding to their burdens. Government should not actively increase the price one pays for being a
religious nonconformist. 5
Second, it is occasionally suggested 6 that to ban school prayer
to protect the rights of dissenters would be inconsistent with West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,9 7 in which the
Court, without holding that the use of the pledge of allegiance was
prohibited entirely, held that a state could not constitutionally
compel objecting school children to recite the pledge. 9 The situations, however, are quite different. In Barnette, the government
used its schools to foster allegiance to the state. This is a legitimate and well-acknowledged function of government, "provided
that [the state] does not infringe the individual's right of intellectual [or religious] nonconformity."9 9 School prayer, however, involves a government effort to foster religion, an end forbidden to it
by the first amendment. There is thus no legitimate government
interest sufficient to offset the competing interest of dissenters in
being free of pressures to conform. 0 0
My second objection to the policy underlying the proposed
amendment arises out of the fact that, if enacted, the amendment
would authorize not only so-called "nondenominational" prayer,
but expressly sectarian prayer as well. Recognizing the almost insurmountable problems inherent in the formulation and implementation of "nondenominational" prayer and the likelihood that
"[a] limitation to 'nondenominational prayer' might well be construed. . . to rule out virtually any prayer except one practically
devoid of religious content," the framers of the proposed amendment specifically drafted it so as not to "limit prayer in public
,3 Cushman, The Holy Bible and the Public Schools, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 475, 495 (1955).
9, Griswold, supra note 80, at 177.

9 See Choper, supra note 80, at 347.
" See Administration Statement, supra note 40, at 33-34.
- 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
98 Id. at 641-42.

Pollak, supra note 53, at 73.
100 See Choper, supra note 80, at 348-60; Pollak, supra note 53, at 72-73. But see
Kauper, supra note 46, at 1062-63.
"
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schools . . . to 'nondenominational prayer.'"101
As the Court has observed, "political division along religious
lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect." 102 In Engel, for example, Justice
Black traced the tumultuous history of The Book of Common
Prayer,which was created under government direction in England
in the sixteenth century and which "set out in minute detail the
accepted form and content of prayer and other religious ceremonies to be used in the established, tax-supported Church of England." 10 3 As Justice Black explained, the controversies over the
book "repeatedly threatened to disrupt the peace" as competing
groups struggled "to impress their particular views upon the Government and obtain amendments of the Book more suitable to
their respective notions of how religious services should be conducted. ' 104 Other groups, "lacking the necessary political power to
influence the Government," decided "to leave England" and to
"seek freedom in America."" 5 The framers of the first amendment
thus "knew the anguish, hardship and bitter strife that could come
when zealous religious groups struggled with one another to obtain
the Government's stamp of approval," and as Black noted the
"First Amendment was added to the Constitution" with this evil in
mind. 0' The lesson of history is that "competition among religious
sects for political and religious supremacy has occasioned considerable civil strife"; part of what is at stake in establishment clause
cases, then, is the prevention of" 'that kind and degree of government involvement in religious life that . . . is apt to lead to strife
and . . . strain a political system to the breaking point.' ,,107
By authorizing government sponsored sectarian prayer in the
public schools, the proposed amendment is likely to produce precisely the conflict and "division along religious lines" the first
101Administration Statement, supra note 40, at 28.
201 Lemon

v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971). See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,

372 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 795-96 (1973); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694-95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1680, 1691-92 (1969). For a critical view of the "political
divisiveness test," see Gaffney, PoliticalDivisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205 (1980).
103Engel, 370 U.S. at 426.
104
105

Id. at 426-27.
Id. at 427.

106 Id. at 429.
107

Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796 (1973) (quoting Walz v. Tax

Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). See also Cahn, supra note 41, at

983.
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amendment was designed to prevent. Indeed, the religious strife
generated in this context is likely to be especially severe, for here
we deal not with mere incidental religious differences over essentially secular issues, 0 8 nor even with religious differences over secular issues that might differentially affect different religious
groups, 0 9 but with religious differences over what are in the most
fundamental sense purely religious issues. Endless and no doubt
occasionally bitter disputes would arise over the use of the Old or
the New Testament, the version of the New Testament, the choice
of texts, the unitarian or trinitarian form of address, and so on.
Moreover, the stakes in such disputes are high. The "winners" receive the imprimatur of government for their faith. The "losers"
must face the prospect that their children will encounter the "cruel
dilemma" of either reciting a prayer that is contrary to their beliefs, conspicuously remaining silent, or leaving the room while
their classmates engage in prayer. Like The Book of Common
Prayer,the practice authorized by the proposed amendment would
intensify religious division as competing groups struggle "to impress their particular views upon the Government and obtain
[prayers] more suitable to their respective notions of how religious
services should be conducted."" 0 Whether or not such a practice is
unconstitutional, it is surely unwise.
There is, moreover, another aspect to this issue. The Court has
consistently "adhered to the principle, clearly manifested in the
history and logic of the Establishment Clause, that no State can
'pass laws which Aid one religion' or that 'prefer one religion over
another.' """ This is, indeed, the "clearest command" of the first
amendment." 2 Even Justice Stewart, the lone dissenter in Engel
and Schempp, agreed that the constitutionality of the challenged
practices "would be extremely doubtful" if the government
designated "a particular religious book" or a "denominational

101Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment's
limitation on the use of Medicaid funds for abortions) ("[T]hat the funding restrictions in
the Hyde Amendment may coincide with the religious tenets of the Roman Catholic Church
does not, without more, contravene the Establishment Clause.").
109 Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971) (holding unconstitutional state
statutes providing state aid to church-related schools) ("Political fragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines are ... likely to be intensified" when "successive and very likely
permanent annual appropriations ...
benefit relatively few religious groups.").
'10 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 426-27.

Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673, 1684 (1982) (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)). See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-07 (1968); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
112 Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673, 1683 (1982).
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prayer."' ' s And even so staunch an opponent of Engel and
Schempp as Professor Charles Rice agrees that the establishment
clause "command[s] impartiality on the part of government as
among the various sects of theistic religions."1 1
The proposed constitutional amendment, by authorizing government sponsored sectarianprayer, directly contravenes this previously unquestioned principle of interfaith neutrality. Let us suppose that the proposed amendment is enacted and that a school
board thereafter authorizes the use of a prayer referring specifically to Jesus as "Our Lord." A Jewish student protests, but the
school authorities tell him that if he does not wish to participate
he may "sit quietly, occupy [himself] with other matters, or leave
the room."1 5 The student and his parents file suit, claiming that
the prayer violates the "clearest command" of the establishment
clause-that government may not "aid one religion" or "prefer one
religion over another." What is the court to do?
There are at least three alternatives. First, the court might
construe the amendment as authorizing only "nondenominational"
prayer. As already indicated, however, even an amendment so limited would pose substantial problems'
and would involve the
courts in the awkward task of determining when a prayer is "nondenominational." In any event, such a construction would fly in
the face of the intent of the framers, who specifically intend not to
"limit prayer in public schools ... to 'nondenominational
prayer.' M17
Second, the court might hold that although the school board
may authorize sectarian prayer, it must do so in conformity with
the neutrality principle. What, though, does this mean? Must the
board follow an "equal time" policy? How is "equal" to be defined? In terms of the religious composition of the community? If
the community is five percent Jewish, do Jews get to write the
prayer one day out of twenty? What if the Methodists disagree
with the Episcopalians who disagree with the Catholics? Should
the court insist on a policy of "separate but equal"? The plain fact
is that the notion of sectarian prayer is irreconcilable with the
principle of neutrality.
Finally, the court might treat the issue as one to be left en"I Schempp, 374 U.S. at 315 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Rice, supra note 39, at 710.
,,sAdministration Statement, supra note 40, at 32.
See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
117 Administration Statement, supra note 40, at 28.
214
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tirely to the discretion of the local school board. This appears to
conform to the intent of the amendment's proponents, who state
that the proposed amendment "does not limit the types of prayer
that are constitutionally permissible and is not intended to afford
a basis for [ judicial intervention] to determine whether or not particular prayers are appropriate for individuals or groups to recite.""1 " This view, if accepted, would render the neutrality principle nugatory and would leave the members of minority faiths at
the mercy of the majority. Such a result is incompatible with this
nation's longstanding commitment to religious toleration. It should
not be enacted into the Constitution.
III.

THE AMENDMENT IS UNNECESSARY

Even if Engel and Schempp were "wrongly" decided, and even
if the policies underlying the proposed constitutional amendment
were sound, the proposed amendment still should not be enacted.
The Constitution of the United States should not be altered
merely to "correct" an "erroneous" or "unpopular" decision of the
Supreme Court. Such a practice, once established as precedent,
may prove too easy to follow and may lead, ultimately, to political
and constitutional instability. 11 9 The Constitution should be
amended only with respect to "fundamental matters of constitutional concern" and only when "the necessity and desirability of
the amendment . . . [are] clearly demonstrated. 1 20 This is especially true with respect to the Bill of Rights, which has never been
amended and has served quite well for almost two hundred years.
The proposed amendment does not deal with a fundamental
matter of constitutional concern. Although the role of religion in
our society is of profound importance, the amendment itself deals
with only a marginal issue. It does not attempt to define the relationship of government and religion in any principled manner, but
Id.
119 The Constitution has been amended only three times to "correct" decisions of the

Supreme Court. The eleventh amendment overturned Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793), which held that a state was subject to suit by a citizen of another state; the
fourteenth amendment overturned Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), which

held that blacks were not "citizens"; and the sixteenth amendment overturned Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), which held an unapportioned direct tax on
income to be unconstitutional.
120 School Prayer:Hearings on S.J. Res. 148 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong., 2d Sess. 605 (1966) (state-

ment of Paul Kauper, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School).
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tries to resolve a narrow, quite specific dispute.121
Moreover, the necessity and desirability of the amendment
have not been demonstrated. Why should the Constitution be
amended to authorize government sponsored prayer in the public
schools? What values or interests are threatened by the current
state of affairs? Presumably, there is a sense among those who support the amendment that our schools should do more to promote
the moral education of the young, that public education should
strive to instill a sense of morality and reverence in students, and
that if the public schools exclude religion they will contribute to
the philosophy of secularism. These are legitimate concerns, but I
do not think they are addressed by the proposed amendment.
The brief recitation of a prayer in unison in the classroom is
hardly likely to contribute significantly to the moral education of
the young. It is at best a deceptively easy way to avoid the problem
of moral education in the public schools. Nor is the practice of government sponsored prayer a particularly effective means to neutralize the potentially secularistic tendencies of public education.
The value of such prayer is more symbolic than real. Students are
apt to regard it as an irrelevant ritual to be dispensed with before
beginning the serious business of the day.
Moreover, the decisions in Engel and Schempp exclude
neither religion nor prayer from the public schools, but only officially sanctioned religious activity. They prohibit not religion, but
government's affirmative promotion of prayer and its direct and
active involvement in religious expression. Nothing in any decision
of the Supreme Court forbids a student to engage in private,
nondisruptive prayer. As both the Supreme Court and the lower
federal and state courts have recognized, Engel and Schempp
12
leave ample room for religion in the school environment.
"I See id.
122 The Reagan Administration has significantly overstated the likely impact of the pro-

posed amendment. For example, in describing court rulings regarding school prayer, the
Administration points to a case in which "a school principal's order forbidding kindergarten
students from saying grace before meals on their own initiative was upheld," Administration
Statement, supra note 40, at 16, implying that the proposed amendment would preclude
such a decision. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The issue in Stein v. Oshinsky, 348
F.2d 999 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965), was not whether the school's decision
to allow a prayer violated the establishment clause; rather, the court held that the school's
decision to exclude the prayer did not violate the free exercise clause. The latter issue is not
affected in any way by the proposed amendment. Indeed, the Administration's apparent
criticism of Stein is especially ironic, for the Administration professes that a central purpose
diversity of state and local approaches" and to accord
of the amendment is "to allow ...
deference to the decisions of "state and local authorities." Administration Statement, supra
note 40, at 29-30. That, of course, is precisely what Stein did. The Administration's criti-
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It is generally accepted, for example, that a public school may
set aside a minute at the beginning of the school day for "silent
meditation or prayer" without running afoul of the establishment
clause. 123 In Gaines v. Anderson,124 for example, a federal district
court expressly upheld such a practice. As the court explained, this
practice "may serve legitimate secular purposes in aid of the educative function," for a "quiet moment at the beginning of the day
would tend to "'still the tumult of the playground and start a day
of study."' "125 Moreover, such a practice "permits meditation or
prayer without mandating the one or the other.' 1 26 The effect is
thus "to accommodate students who desire to use the minute of
silence for prayer or religious meditation, and also other students
who prefer to reflect upon secular matters. '127 Unlike the schemes
in Engel and Schempp, a moment of silence does "not operate to
confront any student with the cruel dilemma of either participating in a repugnant religious exercise or requesting to be excused,"
for if "a student's beliefs preclude prayer in the setting of a minute
of silence in a schoolroom, he may turn his mind silently toward a
secular topic, or simply remain silent,
without. . . facing the scorn
'128
or reproach of his classmates.
This practice, which has been authorized in at least twentyone states, 2 9 embodies a more "reasonable accommodation." Given
the availability of this alternative, it is difficult to understand the

cism of Stein thus suggests that its real goal is not to foster local control, but to promote
prayer. The Administration's analysis of several other decisions is similarly ill considered.
See, e.g., id. at 17 (discussing Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd mem.,
455 U.S. 914 (1982)).
1' See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 280-81 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976); Opinion of the Justices, 113
N.H. 297, 301, 307 A.2d 558, 560 (1973); State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 108 N.J.
Super. 564, 574-75, 262 A.2d 21, 26-27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 57 N.J. 172, 270 A.2d
412 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Choper, supra note 80, at 371; Kauper, supra
note 46, at 1041; Comment, Accommodating Religion in the Public Schools, 59 NEB. L. REV.
425, 450-54 (1980); Note, Religion and the Public Schools, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1078, 1092-93
(1967). But see Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161, 1163 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (invalidating
a Tennessee statute requiring the observance of a minute of silence at the beginning of the
school day because, after reviewing the actual legislative record, the court found that the
"overwhelming intent among legislators supporting the bill, including the sponsors, was to
establish prayer as a daily fixture in the public schoolrooms of Tennessee").
224 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976).
21 Id. at 342 (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 281 n.57 (quoting Wash. Post, June 28,
1962, at A22, col. 2)).
126 Id. at 343.
127 Id.
128

Id. at 345.

'29

See
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supra note 31, at 9 n.24.
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clamor for a constitutional amendment authorizing government
sponsored school prayer. No legitimate government interests are
furthered by the schemes invalidated in Engel and Schempp that
are not also furthered by setting aside a moment for silent meditation or prayer. Perhaps the proponents of the amendment are concerned that this practice denies government the power to dictate
the terms of the prayer, prevents government from making sure
students actually pray, or reduces the pressure to conform. But
these concerns are hardly of sufficient weight to merit amendment
of the Constitution of the United States. Indeed, they are antithetical to the concept of freedom of religion.
The activities of extracurricular student organizations with a
religious orientation present a second example of accommodating
religion in public schools. Although courts have tended to interpret
Engel and Schempp as prohibiting most forms of student-initiated
prayer when the prayer takes place on school property during
school hours as a regular and organized part of the school program, 3 0 there is at least one form of organized student-initiated
prayer that may well be consistent with the first amendment.
In its recent decision in Widmar v. Vincent,' the Supreme
Court held that "a state university, which makes its facilities generally available for the activities of registered student groups,"
cannot constitutionally "close its facilities to a registered student
gi"oup desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.' 13 2 In 1977, the University of Missouri at Kansas
City, which officially recognizes over one hundred student groups
and routinely provides university facilities for the meetings of such
groups, refused to permit an organization of evangelical Christian
students to meet in university buildings because of a regulation
prohibiting the use of university facilities "'for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.' """ In an eight-to-one deciISO See,

e.g., Collins v. Chandler Unified School Dist., 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir.) (invalidat-

ing prayer at student assemblies sponsored by the Student Council), cert. denied, 454 U.S.

863 (1981); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137
Cal. Rptr. 43 (holding that to permit student religious club to conduct its activities on the
school campus during the official school day would violate the establishment clause), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977). See also Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd
mem., 455 U.S. 914 (1982); Kent v. Commissioner of Educ., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 803, 402
N.E.2d 1340 (1980); State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 108 N.J. Super. 564, 262 A.2d 21
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 57 N.J. 172, 270 A.2d 412 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1013 (1971).
131 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
132
3

Id. at 264-65.
Id. at 265 (quoting University of Missouri regulation 4.0314.0107).
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sion, the Court held that the University's "exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech
should be content-neutral."1 3 '
In an effort to justify its exclusionary policy, the university
maintained that to permit religious meetings in its facilities would
violate the establishment clause. Justice Powell, speaking for the
Court, rejected the argument that an "equal access" policy would
be incompatible with the first amendment. An "open-forum policy," Powell maintained, would have the secular purpose of enabling students to exchange ideas. 13 5 Moreover, Powell noted, an
"open-forum" policy would involve less government "entanglement
with religion" than the exclusionary policy, for it would avoid the
need for the university "to determine which words and activities
fall within 'religious worship and religious teaching.' ,36 Finally,
Powell held, "the primary effect" of an "open-forum" policy would
not be to advance religion. Although conceding that religious
groups might benefit from access to university facilities, Powell explained that "a religious organization's enjoyment of merely 'incidental' benefits does not violate the prohibition against the 'primary advancement' of religion."1 37 Here, Powell concluded, the
benefit was only "incidental," for "an open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of State approval on religious sects or practices," and "the forum is available to a broad
class of non-religious as well as religious speakers," thus indicating
that the primary effect is "secular." 138
The potential impact of Widmar on the permissible role of
student-initiated religious organizations in primary and secondary
public schools remains uncertain.1 39 On the one hand, the Court
may extend Widmar with full force, thus according student-initiated religious organizations a right to use school facilities on an
13

Id. at 277. The Court explained that, "[t]hrough its policy of accommodating their

meetings, the University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups," id.
at 267; "to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, the University must ... show that its regulation is neces-

sary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end,"
id. at 269-70.
"3 Id. at 271 n.10.
136

Id. at 272 & n.11.

237

Id.

(1973)).

at 273-74 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771

138

Id. at 274-75.

139

Prior to Widmar, the lower federal courts were divided. Compare Reed v. Van

Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965) (holding that such organizations can meet on
school property) with Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
such organizations cannot meet on school property), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
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equal basis with nonreligious organizations.1 40 On the other hand,
there may be some reluctance to extend Widmar, for public universities do not historically share "the special place of public
schools in American life,"' and, as the Court noted in Widmar,
"[u]niversity students are . . . less impressionable than younger
students and should be [better] able to appreciate that the
[school's] policy is one of neutrality toward religion.' 42 Thus, the
Court may hold Widmar wholly inapplicable to primary and secondary schools.143 Perhaps most likely, however, the Court may
hold Widmar applicable only in part and thus adopt an intermediate approach. For example, the Court might hold that local authorities at their discretion may either exclude religious organizations
from public schools or permit them to operate on an equal basis
with nonreligious organizations. That is, neither the exclusion nor
the equal inclusion of such organizations would be unconstitutional. Alternatively, the Court might permit student-initiated religious organizations to operate in the public schools,' but only in
accord with special regulations governing the nature, timing, and
location of their activities to reduce the dangers of "establishment."'1 44 In short, the law on these questions is currently in flux.
This is no time to amend the Constitution.
Finally, it should be emphasized that neither Engel nor
Schempp prohibits the study of religion in the public schools. To
the contrary, as the Court observed in Schempp, "one's education
is not complete without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civiliza140 The essence of Widmar is "equality." Any grant of special benefits to religious organizations would thus pose a very different problem. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273 n.13.
141 L. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-5, at 825 (1978).

454 U.S. at 274 n.14.
One year after Widmar, the Fifth Circuit invalidated a school board policy authorizing "students to gather at the school with supervision either before or after regular hours on
the same basis as other groups . . . to meet for any educational, moral, religious or ethical
purposes so long as attendance at such meetings is voluntary." Lubbock Civil Liberties
142

143

Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1041 (5th Cir. 1982). In reaching its

result, the court emphasized the unusual factual background of the case and the fact that
the "explicit authorization of religious meetings" arose not out of a general policy concerning student activities, but out of a specific "policy setting forth guidelines on religion in the
school." Id. at 1048.
" Cf. Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48, 54-57 (W.D. Mich. 1965) (setting forth a

series of guidelines governing the permissible activities of religious organizations in public
schools). See generally Toms & Whitehead, The Religious Student in Public Education:
Resolving a Constitutional Dilemma, 27 EMORY L.J. 3 (1978) (discussing the establishment
clause, the free exercise clause, and the free speech clause in context of student religious
groups); Comment, supra note 123, at 457-62 (discussing whether and under what limitations students should be able to hold religious meetings in public school rooms).
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tion," and the "study of the Bible or of religion, when presented
objectively as part of a secular program of education," may "be
effected consistently with the First Amendment. ' 145 Thus, with no
embarrassment from the establishment clause, public schools may
explore the religious and ethical values that illuminate the purposes of our democratic society. It is through this process, and not
sponsored
through the repetitive recitation of a government
146
education.
moral
true
achieve
will
we
prayer, that
CONCLUSION

Whatever legitimate ends the proposed amendment seeks to
achieve are already attainable through other more reasonable and
more effective means. There is simply no sufficient justification to
invoke the solemn processes of constitutional amendment. The
proposed amendment is inconsistent with our contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, it is unsound as a matter of policy, and it
is unnecessary to achieve its most central objectives. It should not
be enacted.

145 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
146

I have not addressed the question of prayer in "public institutions" other than pub-

lic schools because the courts have consistently upheld prayers in the other contexts in
which the issue has arisen. See, e.g., O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (celebration of mass by Pope on the National Mall in Washington, D.C.); Marsa v. Wernik, 86
N.J. 232, 430 A.2d 888 (opening borough council meetings with an invocation or silent meditation), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 958 (1981). Thus, it is not clear what purpose the proposed amendment might have outside the public school area. Although the Administration
cites Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1982), as an example of a decision that
would be overruled by the proposed amendment, Administration Statement, supra note 40,
at 19 & n.50, 31 & n.72, that decision did not focus on prayer as such, but rather on the
state legislature's funding of only one chaplain of one denomination to offer legislative
prayers for sixteen consecutive years, 675 F.2d at 234. The funding issue presumably would
not be affected by the proposed amendment. In any event, the Supreme Court reversed,
finding no establishment clause violation. 51 U.S.L.W. 5162 (U.S. July 5, 1983).

